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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARLIN L. STEWART and CANDICE 
STEWART, husband and wife, 
Pla in t i f f s-AppeHants , 
vs • 
ALDINE J. COFFMAN, JR., 
PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN, 
COFFMAN, COFFMAN and WOODS, a 
professional corporation also 
known as COFFMAN and COFFMAN, 
ANTHONY M. THURBER, and 
KENNETH A. OKAZAKI, jointly 
and severally, 
Defendants. 
(PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN, 
Defendant-Respondent) 
Certiorari No. 
Category No. 13 
(Case No. 860318-CA in 
Court of Appeals; 
originally No. 860167 
in[ Supreme Court) 
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI 
The above Plaintiffs-Appellants hereby petition the Utah 
Supreme Court to review the Opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals 
in the above matter dated and filed January 12, 1988, appeal No. 
860318-CA, copy attached. 
1. QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW. The sole issue on appeal 
is whether a shareholder of a law firm organized under the Utah 
Professional Corporation Act is vicariously liable for the acts 
or omissions of another shareholder of the firm. The Petitioners 
1 
seek a reversal of the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals which 
upheld the decision of the Seventh Judicial District Court of 
Grand County in dismissing Penelope Dalton Coffman (Penelope), a 
shareholder of an incorporated law firm, from the above action. 
The Petitioners submit that the decision of the Court of Appeals 
failed to consider and address the professional aspects of the 
practice of law, contrary holdings by the courts of other States, 
the legislative history and intent of the Professional 
Corporation Act, and the constitutional implications of the its 
decision since the practice of law is regulated by the Supreme 
Court rather than the legislature. 
2• REFERENCE TO OFFICEAL REPORT AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS OF 
OPINION ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS. The Court of Appeals 
issued its written opinion on January 12, 1988. Rehearing was 
denied by order dated January 27, 1988. The opinion has reported 
in 73 Utah Advance Reports at page 119. 
3. STATEMENT OF GROUNDS ON WHICH JURISDICTION OF SUPREME 
COURT IS INVOKED. This is an appeal from a final judgment of the 
Seventh Judicial District Court for Grand County. The appeal was 
originally to the Supreme Court (No. 860167) but was transferred 
to the Court of Appeals. Review of the decision of the Court of 
Appeals is now sought. 
(a) The Date Of Entry Of Decision Sought To Be Reviewed: 
2 
The decision sought to be reviewed was dated and entered on 
January 12, 1988. 
(b) The Date Of The Entry Of Order Respecting Rehearing: 
The Court of Appeals1 order denying the Plaintiffs1 petition for 
rehearing was entered on January 27, 1988. 
(c) Reliance Upon Rule 44(c), Where A Cross-Petition For A 
Writ Of Certiorari Is Filed: Not applicable. This is not a 
cross-petition for certiorari. 
(d) The Statutory Provision Believed To Confer On Supreme 
Court Jurisdiction To Review The Decision In Question By A Writ 
Of Certiorari: Section 78-2-2(3)(a) of the Utah Code Annotated 
provides the Supreme Court with appellate jurisdiction over a 
judgment of the Court of Appeals. Additionally, Section 78-2-
2(2) provides the Supreme Court with original jurisdiction to 
issue extraordinary writs. Further, Article VIII, Section 4 of 
the Utah Constitution imposes upon this Court the duty to 
regulate the practice of law. 
4. CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED. 
Utah State Constitution, Article VIII, Section 1 (Pre-July 1, 
1985): 
The Judicial power of the State shall be vested in the 
Senate sitting as a court of impeachment, in a Supreme 
Court, in district courts, in justices of the peace, 
and such other courts inferior to the Supreme Court as 
3 
may be established by law. 
Utah State Constitution, Article VIII, Section 4 (Effective July 
1, 1985) : 
. .. The supreme court by rule shall govern the practice 
of law, including admission to practice law and the 
conduct and discipline of persons admitted to practice 
law, 
Utah General Partnership Act, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended: 
48-1-10. Partnership bound by partner's wrongful act. 
Where by any wrongful act or omission of any partner 
acting in the ordinary course of the business of the 
partnership or with the authority of his copartners 
loss or injury is caused to any person, not being a 
partner in the partnership, or any penalty is incurred, 
the partnership is liable therefor to the same extent 
as the partner so acting or omitting to act. 
48-1-11. Partnership bound by partner's breach of 
trust. The partnership is bound to make good the loss: 
(1) Where one partner acting within the scope of his 
apparent authority receives money or property of a 
third person and misapplies it; and, 
(2) Where the partnership in the course of its 
business receives money or property of a third person 
and the money or property so received is misapplied by 
any partner while it is in the custody of the 
partnership. 
48-1-12. Nature of partner's liability. 
All partners are liable: 
(1) Jointly and severally for everything chargeable to 
the partnership under sections 48-1-10 and 48-1-11. 
(2) Jointly for all other debts and obligations of the 
partnership; but any partner may enter into a separate 
obligation to perform a partnership contract. 
The Utah Professional Corporation Act, Section 16-11-1 et seq.: 
16-11-3. Purpose of act.—This act shall be so 
construed as to effectuate its general purpose of 
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making available to professional persons the benefits 
of the corporate form for the business aspects of their 
practices while preserving the established professional 
aspects of the personal relationship between the 
professional person and those he serves. 
16-11-10. Laws as to professional relationships not 
altered.--This act does not alter any law applicable to 
the relationship between a person rendering 
professional services and a person receiving such 
servicesf including liability arising out of such 
professional services. 
16-11-5. Application of Utah Business Corporation Act 
— Conflicts. The Utah Business Corporation Act shall 
be applicable to professional corporations, and they 
shall enjoy the powers and privileges and be subject to 
the duties, restrictions and liabilities of other 
corporations, except where inconsistent with this act. 
This act shall take precedence in the event of any 
conflict with the provisions of the Utah Business 
Corporation Act or other laws. 
Section 68-3-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended: 
(5) "Person" includes individuals, bodies politic and 
corporate, partnerships, associations, and companies. 
Rule 1.8(h) of the Rules of Professional Conduct: 
A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively 
limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for 
malpractice unless permitted by law and the client is 
independently represented in making the agreement . . . 
Rule 5.1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct: 
(a) A partner in a law firm shall make reasonable 
efforts to insure that the firm has in effect measures 
giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the 
firm conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
(b) . . . A lawyer shall be responsible for 
another lawyer's violations of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct if: . . . (2) The lawyer is a 
partner in the law firm in which the other lawyer 
5 
practices or has direct supervisory authority over the 
other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time when 
its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails 
to take reasonable remedial action. 
Comment to Rule 5.1 of Rules of Professional Conduct: 
Apart from this Rule and Rule 8.4(a), a lawyer does not 
have disciplinary liability for the conduct of a 
partner, associate or subordinate. Whether a lawyer 
may be liable civilly or criminally for another 
lawyer's conduct is a question of law beyond the scope 
of these Rules. 
Terminology section of Rules of Professional Practice: 
"Partner" denotes a member of a partnership or a 
shareholder in a law firm organized as a professional 
corporation." 
Legislative History. (Set forth in Appendix). 
5. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
Nature of the Case 
This is a legal malpractice case. Plaintiffs appealed to 
the Utah Supreme Court from a final dismissal which dismissed 
defendant Penelope Dalton Coffman (Penelope) from the action 
brought by the Plaintiffs in the Seventh Judicial District Court 
of Grand County against several attorneys including defendants 
Penelope and Aldine J. Coffman, Jr. (Aldine). The case was 
transferred to the Court of Appeals which upheld the district 
court's dismissal of Penelope. 
Statement of Facts 
At the time the suit was filed, Penelope and Aldine were 
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members of Coffman, Coffman and Woods, a professional 
corporation, Penelope filed a motion to dismiss herself as a 
defendant for failure of plaintiffs to state a cause of action 
upon which relief could be granted. The motion was denied 
because there were "no facts presented from which the Court can 
find as a matter of undisputed fact that this Defendant, contrary 
to the allegations of the Complaint, had not (sic) personal 
involvement in the matters alleged." (R. 30-58). Subsequently 
Penelope filed a motion to reconsider supported by her affidavit 
(R. 59-61; 70-71) in which she stated: 
2. Affiant is a member of the law firm Coffman, 
Coffman (and) Woods. 
3. The law firm Coffman, Coffman (and) Woods is a 
professional corporation. 
4. Affiant has not at any time undertaken to 
represent (plaintiffs) in an matter. 
5. Affiant has not corresponded at any time with 
the (plaintiffs), or either of them, with regard to any 
legal matter . 
6. Prior to the filing of this lawsuit, affiant 
never saw the file, never knew the contents of the 
file, never discussed with any other member of the 
lawfirm (sic) the contents of the file, and cannot 
contribute any information through discovery, having no 
personal (knowledge) of any of the events leading up to 
the filing of this lawsuit. 
The motion to dismiss was granted. (R. 72-74; 135-137). In 
its order of dismissal, the trial court stated that the 
undisputed facts showed that Coffman, Coffman and Woods was a 
7 
P.C. and "although (Penelope), is a member of that corporation, 
she had no personal or professional involvement in the matters 
alleged in plaintiffs1 Complaint, the Court concluded (sic) as a 
matter of law from those undisputed facts that there is no cause 
of action against (Penelope)." The Court's judgment as to 
Penelope was ordered final pursuant to Rule 54(b) URCP. (R. 144-
6). The appeal process then commenced, resulting in the opinion 
of the Court of Appeals upholding the trial court's decision. 
ARGUMENT FOR ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT 
MEMBERS OF LAW FIRMS INCORPORATED UNDER THE UTAH 
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION ACT ARE VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR 
THE ACTIONS OF OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CORPORATION EVEN 
ABSENT PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE REPRESENTATION OF A 
CLIENT. THEREFORE, THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION MUST 
BE REVERSED 
I. 
THE CASE RAISES AN IMPORTANT QUESTION REGARDING THE 
PRACTICE OF LAW WHICH HAS NOT BEEN, BUT SHOULD BE, 
SETTLED BY THIS COURT. 
This Court is charged under the Utah State Constitution with 
regulating the practice of law. In Re Disciplinary Action of 
McCune, Utah, 717 P.2d 701, 704-5 (1986) . The issue of vicarious 
liability for members of professional law corporations has not 
been considered by this Court. The Utah Bar Association and Utah 
Trial Lawyers Association have in the Court of Appeals taken 
opposite stands as amicus curiae, showing that the issue is 
complex and significant. All Utah lawyers and the public they 
8 
serve are affected by this issue* Accordingly, the issue raised 
is an important matter which should be settled by review. The 
Court should exercise its discretion pursuant to Rule 43(4) of 
the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court and issue a writ of 
certiorari. 
II. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION FAILED TO CONSIDER THE 
TRADITIONAL PARTNERSHIP LIABILITY WHICfl ATTACHED TO LAW 
FIRMS, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PROFESSIONAL 
CORPORATION ACT AND CONFLICTING DECISIONS BY OTHER 
COURTS. 
Aldine and Penelope are each members of the Defendant law 
firm Coffman, Coffman and Woods, a professional corporation. (R. 
24-29; 32-34; 59-61). The professional corporation, if it in 
fact exists, must be incorporated under authority of the Utah 
Professional Corporation Act, Section 16-11-1 et seq. of the Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
Prior to the adoption of the Professional Corporation Act in 
1963, law firms necessarily existed in the form of partnerships 
subject to the liabilities imposed by partnership law. Petition 
of Bar Asso., 55 Hawaii 121, 516 P.2d 1267 (1973). Williams v. 
Burns, 463 F Supp 1278, (D.C. Colo, 1979). Sections 48-1-10, 11 
and 12 of the Utah General Partnership Act, which was adopted in 
1921, provided that the partnership and all partners as of the 
date liability arose are jointly and severally liable for the 
wrongful acts or omissions of any partner acting in the ordinary 
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course of business. Sections 16-11-3 and 10 of the Professional 
Corporation Act state that although the act allows professionals 
the use of the corporate form for business purposes, the act is 
not intended to alter the professional relationship between the 
professional and his client and specifically is not intended to 
alter any law of liability applicable to the relationship* 
Section 16-11-3 provides that the corporate form is made 
available "to professional persons". "Professional persons" 
includes professional partnerships since Section 68-3-12(5) of 
the Utah Code Annotated provides that "person" in a statute shall 
be construed to mean partnerships and associations. The 
legislative history, set forth in the appendix, shows that the 
legislature did not intend to alter the traditional form of 
liability regarding law firms. Even the terminology section of 
Rules of Professional Practice recognize identical continuing 
professional responsibilities for partnership members and 
professional corporation members: 
"Partner" denotes a member of a partnership or a 
shareholder in a law firm organized as a professional 
corporation." 
Therefore, the preexisting status of law firm members being 
vicariously liable for the professional misdeeds of their fellow 
members remains applicable to members of professional 
corporations. In Petition of Bar Assoc., Supra, the Hawaii 
10 
Supreme Court recognized that the liability of attorneys of 
incorporated law firms for the malpractice of their associates 
should not be limited and that the partnership law of liability 
should continue to apply. The same result was reached in South 
High Development Limited v. Weyner, Lippe and Cromley Co., 
L.P.A., 445 N.E.2d 1106 (Ohio, 1983). In First Bank & Trust Co. 
v. Zagoria, 250 GA. 844, 302 SE 2d 674, (1983), 39 ALR 4th 551, 
on remand, Zagoria v. Du Bose Enterprises, Inc., 167 Ga App 120, 
306 SE 2d 433, the Georgia Supreme Court unanimously held that a 
lawyer who holds himself out as a member of a law firm, whether 
it is a partnership or a professional corporation, is liable for 
the professional misconduct of other members of the firm even 
when the lawyer has had no involvement in the transaction which 
gave rise to the liability. The Court of Appeals1 decision 
ignored this authority. 
The Court of Appeals emphasized the words, "for the business 
aspects" when quoting Section 16-11-3 UCA. (Slip. Op. at 3). 
Its decision was based upon the erroneous impression that 
liability of law firm members to law firm clients is a business 
aspect of the practice of law. The statute expressly says that 
it is not intended "to alter any law applicable to the 
relationship between a person rendering professional services and 
a person receiving such services, including liability ...". 
11 
(Section 16-11-10, emphasis added.) Again, "person" includes 
partnerships (Section 68-3-12(5)) and, therefore, legal 
partnerships. The corporate form was intended to provide the 
lawyer with tax advantages (Legislative history, page 4), taxes 
clearly being a "business aspect" of the practice of law. While 
the corporate form might arguably be construed to protect law 
firm members from individual liability to a delivery man who 
slips and falls in the office lobby, or from individual liability 
to pay for office supplies ("business aspects" of the practice of 
law) it cannot be construed to limit liability relating to 
professional services rendered. The Court of Appeals erred in 
construing professional liability to be a "business aspect" of 
the practice of law. 
TIC. 
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO ADDRESS 
THE PROFESSIONAL ASPECTS OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW AND 
IGNORED THE UTAH CONSTITUTION'S MANDATE THAT THE 
PRACTICE OF LAW BE REGULATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, 
RATHER THAN BY THE LEGISLATURE. 
The Court of Appeal!s decision rests on the assumption that 
the practice of law is just another business which is subject to 
regulation by the legislature. Such assumption is invalid. Even 
if, arguendo, the legislature's clear statement in Section 16-11-
10 of the Professional Corporation Act is incorrectly construed 
to find legislative intent to alter the professional relationship 
12 
between clients and law firms, such an interpretation assumes an 
unconstitutional exercise of power by the legislature. The power 
of regulating the professional conduct of attorneys rests with 
the Supreme Court, not the legislature. In Re Disciplinary 
Action of McCune, Utah, 717 P.2d 701, 704-5 (1986); First Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 250 GA. 844, 302 SE 2d 674, (1983), 39 ALR 
4th 551, on remand, Zagoria v. Du Bose Enterprises, Inc., 167 Ga 
App 120, 306 SE 2d 433. Article VIII, Section 1 of the pre-
1985 Utah Constitution conferred and the current Article VIII, 
Section 4 of the Constitution confers the power of regulating the 
practice of law on the Supreme Court. In Re Disciplinary Action 
of McCune, supra, p.704. The legislature has no power to alter 
the professional relationship between clients and law firms who 
represent them and the Professional Corporation Act should not be 
interpreted to find such an abuse of power by the legislature 
unless the Court is willing to also declare the act 
unconstitutional. 
In Zagoria, supra. at page 553 of 39 ALR 4th, the Georgia 
Supreme Court stated: 
We do not view this case as one in which we need to 
interpret the statute providing for the creation and 
operation of professional corporations. We rather view 
this case as one which calls for the exercise of this 
court's authority to regulate the practice of law. 
This court has the authority and in fact the duty to 
regulate the law practice and in the past two decades 
we have been diligent in our exercise of this duty.... 
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The diligence of this court has been directed toward 
the assurance that the law practice will be a 
professional service and not simply a commercial 
enterprise. The primary distinction is that a 
profession is a calling which demands adherence to the 
public interest as the foremost obligation of the 
practitioner. The professional corporation statute 
should be interpreted with this thought in mind. The 
legislature has the clear right to enact technical 
rules for the creation and operation of professional 
corporation, but it cannot constitutionally cross the 
gulf separating the branches of government by imposing 
regulations upon the practice of law. 
e court further appropriately stated: 
The shareholders of a professional Corporation have the 
same insulation from liability as shareholders of other 
corporations with respect to obligations of a purely 
business and nonprofessional nature. However, the 
influence of the statute upon the professional 
corporation cannot extend to the regulation of the law 
practice so as to impose a limitation of liability for 
acts of malpractice obligations incurred because of a 
breach of a duty to a client. 
The professional nature of the law practice and its 
obligations to the public interest require that each 
lawyer be civilly responsible for his professional 
acts. A lawyer's relationship to his client is a very 
special one. So also in the relationship between a 
lawyer and the other members of his or her firm a 
special one. When a client engages the services of a 
lawyer the client has the right to expect the fidelity 
of other members of the firm. It is inappropriate for 
the lawyer to be able to play hide-and-seek in the 
shadows and folds of the corporate veil and thus escape 
the responsibilities of professionalism. 
We cannot allow a corporate veil to hang from the 
cornices of professional corporations which engage in 
the law practice. 
., p. 554-5. 
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Once the high ethical duties inherent in the practice of law 
are brought into consideration it becomes clear that this Court 
must adopt the holding of the Georgia Supreme Court. The 
legislature has no power to ignore, and the Supreme Court is 
charged with the high duty to assure, the highest integrity of 
the practice of law. The practice of law cannot tolerate a 
double standard of liability between attorneys who practice law 
by traditional partnership and those who choose to operate their 
partnerships as "professional corporations". 
The decision of the Court of Appeals invites the "hide-and-
seek" games feared by the court in ZagorJQ. One can readily 
foresee "professional corporations" wherein profit sharing occurs 
but each "shareholder" privately owns a different reporting 
system, his own computer, copier and other equipment and the 
corporation itself owns no physical assets subject to levy. 
Lawyers will enjoy the benefit of shared profits without the risk 
of losses and rightly retain the public image of a privileged 
class. One can also foresee, as a result of the Court of 
Appeal1s decision, shareholders who are, in fact, participating 
in a case, not listing themselves as co-counsel and lurking in 
the shadows so as to not be detected by a potentially aggrieved 
client. The public thus becomes the victim of a game of hide-
and-seek enjoyed by a class which, while ostensibly burdened with 
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high duties to the public, in fact enjoys high privileges at the 
expense of the public. 
The public deserves more from the legal profession than it 
receives from the decision of the Court of Appeals. This Court 
should issue a writ of certiorari and upon review, reverse the 
decision of the Court of Appeals. 
IV. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION FOUND THAT THE RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT DO NOT OF THEMSELVES CREATE A 
BASIS OF LIABILITY. HOWEVER, ASSUMING SUCH TO BE TRUE, 
NEITHER DO THE RULES ABROGATE THE ESTABLISHED LAW ABOVE 
SET FORTH. 
The Court of Appeals erroneously found that traditional 
principals of business corporation liability applies to lawyers1 
malpractice. (Slip op. at 3-4). It then stated regarding the 
Rules of Professional Responsibility: 
Clearly the Utah Supremo Court is only concerned with 
potential disciplinary actions and liability. In 
regulating the practice of law, the Supreme Court has 
done nothing to change those principle of corporate law 
discussed earlier . 
(Slip op. at 6). The Court of Appeals is at least correct in 
recognizing that the Rules of Professional Conduct do not 
abrogate existing law regarding professional liability. However, 
it errors in applying business corporation law where the 
established principals of professional liability in the legal 
profession have included vicarious liability as discussed above. 
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6. APPENDIX. An appendix is attached which contains the 
following: 
Opinion of Court of Appeals. 
Order denying Petition for Rehearing 
Affidavit of Penelope Dalton Coffman 
District Court's Ruling on Motion To Reconsider Motion to 
Dismiss 
Legislative History 
CONCLUSION 
A writ of certiorari should immediately issue. The Court of 
Appeals1 and trial court's decisions must be reversed. In the 
event that the action has been tried before this appeal is 
reviewed, Penelope Dalton Coffman should be ordered subject to 
and bound by any judgment entered against Aldine J. Coffman, Jr. 
and/or the professional corporation. 
Respectfully submitted this /<) day of February, 1988. 
*<<<*. - 'C* - -. 
PAUL W. MORTENSEN 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS 
stewapp.crt 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Marlin L. Stewart and Candice 
Stewart, Husband and Wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Aldine J. Coffman, Jr., and 
Penelope Dalton Coffman, 
Coffman, Coffman and Woods, 
a professional corporation 
also known as Coffman and 
Coffman, Anthony ML Thurber, 
and Kenneth A. Okazaki, 
jointly and severally, 
Defendants and Respondent, 
Before Judges Jackson, Orme and Davidson, 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. S60318-CA 
JAN 1 Q -fv 
DAVIDSON, Judge: 
Plaintiffs appeal from the final judgment of dismissal 
which dismissed defendant Penelope Dalton Coffman (Penelope) 
from a legal malpractice action brought by plaintiffs against 
several attorneys including defendants Penelope and Aldine J. 
Coffman, Jr. (Aldine). We affirm. 
At the time the suit was filed, Penelope and Aldine were 
members of Coffman, Coffman and Woods, a professional 
corporation. Penelope filed a motion to dismiss herself as a 
defendant for failure of plaintiffs to state a cause of action 
upon which relief could be granted. The motion was denied 
because there were "no facts presented from which the Court can 
find as matter of undisputed fact that this Defendant, contrary 
to the allegations of the Complaint, had not [sic] personal 
involvement in the matters alleged." Subsequently, Penelope 
filed a motion to reconsider supported by her affidavit in 
which she stated: 
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2. Affiant is a member of the law firm 
Coffman, Coffman [and] Woods. 
3. The law firm Coffman, Coffman [and] 
Woods is a professional corporation. 
4. Affiant has not at any time 
undertaken to represent [plaintiffs] 
in any matter. 
5* Affiant has not corresponded at any 
time with the [plaintiffs], or either 
of them, with regard to any legal 
matter. 
6. Prior to the filing of this lawsuit, 
affiant never saw the file, never 
knew the contents of the file, never 
discussed with any other member of 
the lawfirm [sic] the contents of the 
file, and cannot contribute any 
information through discovery, having 
no personal [knowledge] of any of the 
events leading up to the filing of 
this lawsuit. 
The motion to dismiss was granted. In its order of 
dismissal, the trial court stated that the undisputed facts 
showed that Coffman, Coffman and Woods was a P.C. and "although 
[Penelope], is a member of that corporation, she had no 
personal or professional involvement in the matters alleged in 
plaintiffs' Complaint, the Court concluded [sic] as a matter of 
law from those undisputed facts that there is no cause of 
action against [Penelope]." 
The issue on appeal is whether a shareholder of a law 
firm organized under the Utah Professional Corporation Act 
(UPCA) is vicariously liable for the acts or omissions of 
another shareholder of the firm. 
The appropriate standard of review dictates that "we 
accord conclusions of law no particular deference, but review 
them for correctness." Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 
1070 (Utah 1985) . 
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THE UTAH PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION ACT 
The UPCA is delineated in Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-11-1 to 
-15 (1987). UPCA's purpose, is stated in § 16-11-3: 
This act shall be so construed as to 
effectuate its general purpose of making 
available to professional persons the 
benefits of the corporate form for the 
business aspects of their practices while 
preserving the established professional 
aspects of the personal relationship between 
the professional person and those he serves. 
(Emphasis added.) In § 16-11-10, professional relationships 
are specifically addressed: 
This act does not alter any law applicable 
to the relationship between a person 
rendering professional services and a 
person receiving such services, including 
liability arising out of such professional 
services. 
These sections establish that the UPCA provides the 
benefits of corporate status to professional corporations, but 
there is nothing therein which creates or extends vicarious 
liability to other shareholders. 
The UPCA, in § 16-11-5, emphasizes that professional 
corporations are to be treated as other corporations: 
The Utah Business Corporation Act shall be 
applicable to professional corporations, 
and they shall enjoy the powers and 
privileges and be subject to the duties, 
restrictions and liabilities of other 
corporations, except where inconsistent 
with this act. This act shall take 
precedence in the event of any conflict 
with provisions of the Utah Business 
Corporation Act or other laws. 
The Oregon Supreme Court in Amfac Foods, Inc. v. International 
Systems & Controls Corp., 294 Or. 94, 654 P.2d 1092 (1982), 
860318-CA 
presented a lengthy discussion concerning exceptions to 
shareholder immunity in the context of general corporate law. 
However, the general rule is described as follows: 
The question of when and under what 
circumstances a shareholder becomes liable 
for a corporate obligation has troubled 
judges and lawyers for a century or so. 
Although corporate shareholders were not 
insulated from liability for debts of the 
corporation in common law England, 
shareholder insulation from such liability 
has been a cornerstone of corporate law in 
the United States since the nineteenth 
century. Virtually every state has a 
statute similar to [Oregon's],1 which 
limits a shareholder's liability to the 
cost of the shares held. 
Id. at 1096 (footnotes omitted). Following this general 
interpretation of corporate law and finding no specific 
justification in either the UPCA or the Utah Business 
Corporation Act, we hold that a shareholder in a corporation 
organized under the UPCA is not vicariously liable for the acts 
or omissions of another shareholder in the performance of 
professional service unless that shareholder has participated 
in the alleged acts or omissions. 
THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
The Utah Constitution art. VIII, § 4 states "The supreme 
court by rule shall govern the practice of law, including 
admission to practice law and the conduct and discipline of 
persons admitted to practice law." See In re Disciplinary 
Action of McCune, 717 P.2d 701, 704 n.2 (Utah 1986); Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-4(3) (1987). It is argued that the Supreme Court, 
by adopting the Proposed Rules of Professional Conduct, 
scheduled to be effective January 1, 1988, has created 
vicarious liability for shareholder attorneys. However, this 
is not the case. The Scope section of the Proposed Rules 
contains the following statements: 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-23 (1987). 
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Failure to comply with an obligation or 
prohibition imposed by a Rule is a basis 
for involving the disciplinary process.. 
Violation of a Rule should not give rise 
to a cause of action nor should it create 
any presumption that a legal duty has been 
breached. The Rules are designed to 
provide guidance to lawyers and to provide 
a structure for regulating conduct through 
disciplinary agencies* They are not 
designed to be a basis for civil liability. 
Accordingly, nothing in the Rule should be 
deemed to augment any substantive legal 
duty of lawyers or the extra-disciplinary 
consequences of violating such a duty. 
In the Terminology section, "partner" is defined as "[denoting] 
a member of a partnership and a shareholder in a law firm 
organized as a professional corporation." 
Rule 5.1 delineates the responsibilities of a partner or 
supervisory lawyer in law firms and associations. Rule 5.1(a) 
states a partner's obligation is to ensure reasonable efforts 
are made to be sure that all lawyers within the firm conform to 
the Rules. Rule 5.1(b) specifically requires supervisory 
lawyers to make reasonable efforts to ensure those lawyers they 
supervise conform to the Rules. 
Rule 5.1(c) states: 
A lawyer shall be responsible for 
another lawyer's violation of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct if: 
(1) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge 
of the specific conduct, ratifies the 
conduct involved; or 
(2) the lawyer is a partner in the law 
firm in which the other lawyer 
practices, or has direct supervisory 
authority over the other lawyer, and 
knows of the conduct at a time when 
its consequences can be avoided or 
mitigated but fails to take 
reasonable remedial action. 
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The Comment to Rule 5.1 is also instructive. "Apart from this 
Rule and Rule 8.4(a),2 a lawyer does not have disciplinary 
liability for the conduct of a partner, associate or 
subordinate. Whether a lawyer may be liable civilly or 
criminally for another lawyer's conduct is a question of law 
beyond the scope of these Rules." Clearly the Utah Supreme 
Court is only concerned with potential disciplinary actions and 
has specifically refrained from addressing questions of civil 
liability. In regulating the practice of law, the Supreme Court 
has done nothing to change those principles of corporate law 
discussed earlier. 
The dismissal of the trial court is affirmed, 
plaintiffs. 
Costs against 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
2. Rule 8.4(a): It is professional misconduct for a lawyer 
to: (a) Violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so 
through the acts of another. 
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IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS 
— o O o — 
Marlin L. Stewart and Candice Stewart, ORDER 
Husband and Wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 860318-CA 
Aldine J. Coffman, Jr., Penelope Dalton 
Coffman, Coffman, Coffman and Woods, 
a professional corporation also known as 
Coffman and Coffman, Anthony M. Thurber, 
and Kenneth A, Okazaki, jointly and severally, 
Defendants and Respondent. 
Pursant to the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals 3(a), 
appellant's petition for rehearing is denied. 
Dated this 27th day of January, 1988. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Timothy M. Shea 
Clerk of the Court 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL 
IN AND FOR GRAND 
. STEWART and 
CANDICE STEWART, Husband 
and Wife 
vs. 
ALDINE J 
t 
Plaintiffs, 
. COFFMAN, JR., 
COUNTY, 
DISTRICT ( 
STATE OF 
:OURT 
UTAH 
AFFIDAVIT 
PENELOPE 
Civil No 
DALTON 
» 
OF 
COFFMAN 
PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN, 
COFFMAN, COFFMAN AND WOODS, 
a professional corporation, 
a/k/a COFFMAN and COFFMAN, 
ANTHONY M. THURBER, and 
KENNETH A. OKAZAKI, 
jointly and severally, 
t Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
GRAND COUNTY ) 
PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN, being first duly sworn, on oath 
deposes and says: 
XI 
1. Affiant is an attorney licensed to practice lav; in 
the State of Utah. 
2. Affiant is a member of the law firm Coffman, Coffman 
& Wood* 
3. The law firm Coffman, Coffman & Woods is a 
professional corporation. 
4. Affiant has not at any time undertaken to represent 
Marlin L. Stewart or Candice Stewart in any matter* 
5. Affiant has not corresponded at any time with the 
Stewarts, or either of them, with regard to any legal matter. 
6. Prior to the filing of this lawsuit, affiant never 
saw the file, never knew the contents of the file, never 
discussed with any other member of the lawfirm the contents of 
the file, and cannot contribute any information through 
discovery, having no personl knowedge of any of the events 
leading up to the filing of this lawsuit. 
DATED this u? • day of January, 1986. 
VvtOO 
I DALTON COFF> PENELOPE MAN 
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Subscribed and Sworn to before me this ///?"// day of 
January, 1986* 
NOTARY PUBLIC ^ 
Residing a t : nioaJe tool, 
My Commission Expires: 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed postage prepaid this 
/(, U, day of January, 1986, a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing to: ' 
Paul W. Mortensen, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
131 East 100 South 
P.O. Box 339 
Moab, Utah 84532-0339 
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TIM DALTON DUNN, Bar #0936 
ANNE SWENSEN, -Bar #4252 
HANSON, DONN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Aldine J. Coffman, Penelope Dalton Coffman 
& Coffman, Coffman and Woods 
650 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone : (801) 363-7611 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
MARLIN L. STEWART and 
CANDICE STEWART, Husband 
and Wife, 
Plaintiffs, : 
vs. 
ALDINE J. COFFMAN, JR., 
PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN, 
COFFMAN, COFFMAN AND WOODS, 
a professional corporation, 
a/k/a COFFMAN and COFFMAN, 
ANTHONY M. THURBER, and 
KENNETH A. OKAZAKI, 
jointly and severally, 
Defendants. 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
Civil No. 5370 
DEFENDANT PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN moves the court to 
reconsider its ruling on her Motion to Dismiss. 
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The court denied this defendant's Motion to Dismiss on 
January 15, 1986* That ruling was apparently made prior to the 
court's receipt of this defendant's Reply Memorandum and 
supporting Affidavit* 
This defendant therefore respectfully requests that the 
court reconsider its Motion to Dismiss, including the Reply 
Memorandum and Affidavit currently on file herein. 
DATED this ^ ^ day of January, 1986. 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
Is) 
ANNE SWENSEN 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed postage prepaid this 
- f>£? ^
 d a y o f januaryf 1986, a true #nd accurate copy of the 
foregoing to: 
Paul W. Mortensen, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
131 East 100 South 
P.O. Box 339 
Moab, Utah 84532-0339 
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HOUSE BILL 197 
INCORPORATION OF PERSONS 
RENDERING PROFESSIONAL SERVICES 
Sponsors: Reed A. Watkins, Eighth District 
J. Robert Bullock, Eleventh District 
George R. Aiken, Twenty-Sixth District 
BILL SIGNED BY THE GOVERNOR MARCH 19, 1963 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DEBATE, THIRD DISCUSSION 
MR. SPEAKER: To incorporate for tax 
benefits (inaudible) Representative Watkins? 
REPRESENTATIVE WATKINS: I move we accept the 
Committee report. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Seconded. 
SPEAKER: Thank you. It has been moved and 
seconded we adopt the Committee report. All in favor of this 
motion, say Aye. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKERS: Aye. 
MR. SPEAKER: Cause in all? The ayes have it. 
It is now before us for consideration and explanation by 
Representative Watkins. Will you proceed? 
REPRESENTATIVE WATKINS: Mr. Speaker and members 
of the House. It is well known that employees of 
corporations receive some definite tax benefits under our 
federal law. And through the years individuals who have 
operated sole proprietorships have been able to form 
xv l 
ORIGINAL 
1 corporations and in effect become employees of their own 
2 corporation, so that they too may participate along with the 
3 rest of their employees for these benefits. 
4 When it comes to the area of professional services, 
5 there has been some questions in the ethics of the 
6 professions as well as some possible question as to whether 
7 say a doctor, could incorporation for the practice of his 
8 profession. 
9 The present House Bill 197 is a bill that would 
10 enable professional individuals under regulation by their 
11 own regulating board, as well as supervision by the 
12 Secretary of State under the forming of the corporation. 
13 But this Bill would enable professinal people to practice 
14 their profession by the business means of a corporation. It 
15 would have no effect whatsoever, upon the personal 
16 relationship treated between the doctor and his patient, for 
17 example, or the dentist and his patient or the lawyer and 
18 his client but would merely enable them to conduct their 
19 business in a corporate form rather than as most of them do 
20 now, as sole proprietorships or as partnerships. 
21 I might mention this: That this type legislation has 
22 received very favorable treatment throughout the United 
23 States. As of one year ago about 15 states had met this 
24 problem and had formed or have enacted enabling legislation 
25 of one kind of another to allow the same result. Several of 
2 
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1 those had done it by means of a professional corporation 
2 act. Other states by allowing what they call an association 
3 act. As of today, one year later, about 23 or 24 states 
4 have now passed this type of enabling legislation and, to my 
5 knowledge, similar legislation is before most, if not all, 
6 of the other states. 
7 This is the basic purpose of the Act. It is, I 
8 should say, a non-controversial bill. It has the support of 
9 the medical profession. It has the support of the dental 
10 profession and other professions and I don't think that 
11 there would be any particular objections. 
12 If anyone has a question I'll be certainly happy to 
13 do my best to answer it. 
14 MR. SPEAKER: Representative Leverage? 
15 REPRESENTATIVE LOVERAGE: Mr. Speaker, I should 
16 like to ask Representative Watkins a question. 
17 MR. SPEAKER: Will you respond? 
18 REPRESENTATIVE WATKINS: Yes. 
19 REPRESENTATIVE LOVERAGE: In connection with 
20 suits, liable suits, would these individuals still be 
21 individually liable in the case of a suit of liable? I know 
22 that in some instances corporations may not be, individuals 
23 may not be sued but only the corporation. Now, what would 
24 I be the status of these people? 
25 I REPRESENTATIVE WATKINS: I can read Section 10 
3 
xviii 
1 I of the Act which states: "This Act does not alter any law 
2 | applicable to the relationship between a person rendering 
3 I professional services and a person receiving such services, 
4 including liability arising out of such professinal 
5 services." 
6 Therefore, the doctor, for example, who 
7 incorporates, would not be given limited liability as most 
8 corporations provide. That is the—I might mention this 
9 too: The term has been coined "Professional Corporation" 
10 for this very reason, to point out that the professional 
11 ethics and the same standards that now exist between the 
12 professional person and his client or patient will remain 
13 even though he incorporates. 
14 If there are no other questions, Mr. Speaker— 
15 REPRESENTATIVE PETERSON: Mr. Speaker, I should 
16 like to ask Representative Watkins a question. Could you 
17 just briefly tell us what these tax advantages are with 
18 regards to these professional people? 
19 REPRESENTATIVE WATKINS: The main tax advantage, 
20 Mr. Peterson, is the adoption of what we call profit 
21 sharing or pension plans. Under the corporation, of 
22 course, it can adopt a plan for the benefit of its 
23 employees. A partnership can do the same thing for the 
24 benefit of the employees, but in the partnership the partner 
25 I is not an employee, he is an employer. Whereas, under a | 
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corporation, the owner-type person is both an employee as 
well as an owner of stock. So this is the main benefit, 
that of the adoption of retirement plans such as pension and 
profit sharing plans. 
MR. SPEAKER: Any further questions? The 
question has been called for. I'll ask the chief clerk to 
call the role on final passage. Representative Peterson? 
REPRESENTATIVE PETERSON: Mr. Speaker, if there 
is no opposition to this Bill I would move the rules be 
suspended, The clerk be permitted to cast the vote of the 
entire House in favor of this bill. 
MR. SPEAKER: You heard the motion. All in 
favor— 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (Inaudible). 
MR. SPEAKER: Any final direction? Any other 
objections? All right. All except Representative Anderson, 
all in favor of this motion say aye. 
UNIDENTIFIES SPEAKERS: Aye. 
MR. SPEAKER: All those no? The ayes have it 
and if you'll remain in your seats I will ask the chief 
clerk to make the count. 
END OF RECORDING. 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
) 
) ss. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Penny C. Abbott, do hereby certify I am a 
Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public in and for 
the State of Utah. That on the 9th day of September, 1987 I 
transcribed into typewritten form, from tape recording, the 
record a House of Representatives hearing regarding House 
Bill 197 as herein contained in pages 1 through 5, both 
inclusive. And that said transcript is accurate to the best 
of my knowledge and ability, some parts of the recording 
being inaudible due to background noise and numerous persons 
speaking at once. 
WITNESS my hand and official seal this 1st day of 
September, 1987. 
0 GLM^U 
Penny C ^ Abbott, C.S.R. 
& Notary/Public 
My commission expires: 
September 24, 1988 
Penny C. Abbott, C.S.R. 
3241 South 4840 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
Phone: 966-4862 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Served the foregoing Petition for Certiorari this 
day of February, 1988, by mailing four copies thereof, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
TIM DALTON DUNN 
650 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Respondent 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
STEPHEN J. HILL 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floc)r 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae 
Utah State Bar Association 
COOK & WILDE, P.C. 
ROBERT H. WILDE 
6925 Union Park Center 
Suite 490 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae 
Utah Trial Lawyers Association 
PAUL W. MORTENSEN 
